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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focusses on the study of the consequences of the current financial 
crisis on dividend policy of Portuguese companies.  
The data used in this dissertation are data collected during a time period of the 8 years, 
between 2005 and 2012.  
The study follows a panel data model with fixed effects approach. This analysis shows 
that during the crisis the companies in the sample have not changed their dividend 
payout significantly. Thus, it can be concluded that the current financial crisis have no 
impact on dividend payout policies. 
Many listed companies on PSI-20 are less profitable during financial crisis period and 
experience lower amounts of net income, and they just had to rescue their own funds to 
maintain the level of the dividend payment in order to handle the financial crisis. We 
believe that managers took into account the fact that decreasing dividend payment could 
create uncertainty among investors which could lead to large negative stock price 
reactions.  
The dissertation also concludes that large firms can maintain their dividend payout 
levels more easily. Furthermore, we found that large companies increase dividend 
payout during 2010, they are motivated by extraordinary and anticipated dividend 
payment by companies from possible changes to the tax regime as suggested in the 
national budget for 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-words: Corporate finance, dividend payout, financial crisis, tax regime, stock 
prices, investors. 
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1. Introduction: motivation, aim and research question   
A financial crisis that began in 2007 as a result of consumers default on sub-prime 
mortgages has had dramatic effect on the United State (US) market and was the starting 
point for a domino effect affecting the global economy. Due to the difficult business 
environment companies took different measure in order to manage the crisis and one of 
the measures was to adjust the dividend payout.  
We expect that financial crisis affects too much a firm from a different perspective, for 
example decreasing sales, decreasing earnings, and reduce firm liquidity. In fact, the 
value of the firms depends on its cash flows, and the value of shares is a function of the 
expectation of obtaining dividends in corporate finance decision. 
Dividend policy is considered to be one of the main corporate finance decision, together 
with investment and financing decision that a firm have to make, as a states 
byDamodaran (2010). It has been one of the most debated subjects in finance. Finance 
scholars have involved in wide research to describe why firms should pay and it is 
disappearing phenomenon, as noted byDenis and Osobov (2008), Fama and French 
(2001), Fatemi and Bildik (2012) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). 
Normally managers are not willing to decrease the dividends since it may be interpreted 
as a negative signal. Usually they try to keep or increase dividend payout. But during 
financial crisis periods this tendency could be abandoned. The most of the largest 
companies in Portugal maintained a stable dividend payout and a few companies 
increased the dividend payout to the shareholders. 
The level of the current financial crisis gives emphasis to understand how dividend 
policy affects company’s value. This study will provides evidence on this issue by 
studying the impact of financial crisis on corporate dividend policy. In this paper we 
will attempt to examine the relationship between dividend payout and firm’s value 
under financial crisis periods in Portugal. The purpose of this dissertation is to present a 
fair view towards this long debate about dividend policy and introduce new approach 
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regarding the achievement of the financial crisis on corporate dividend policies in 
Portugal.  
The methodology we use it is the same one proposed by Smits (2012), the multivariate 
analysis which is an approach to panel data model to explain the relationship between 
variables and dividend distribution policy, given that, dividend payout is a proxy for this 
policy. This model is the most used technique in this kind of assessment when we 
account the occurrence of the temporal and longitudinal variations. The model 
estimation was made by using GRETL program. Gretl is uprising Econometric Analysis 
software that has been gaining traction in the most prominent Universities in the World. 
We use various variables from information sources including the accounting and 
financial information to measure whether there are any factors that produced (caused) 
increases or decreases in dividend payments these times. We will use a very large 
database of Portuguese companies listed on PSI-20 from 2005 to 2012. We collect all 
the information from DataStream at school of Economics and Management, University 
of Porto. 
This paper will proceed as follows. Sections 2 will present the review of the literature 
related to financial crisis. While in Section 3 the data description and hypothesis will be 
developed.  Methodology and empirical results will be discussed in sections 4 and 5 
whereas section 6 will deal with the conclusion. 
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2. Literature review 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of relevant research on dividend 
policy, particularly on stages of firm´s characteristic theory suggested by Fama and 
French (2001) and its impact on dividend payout. 
The literature suggests that the financial crisis is a situation in which the supply of cash 
cannot keep up with the demand for cash. So this means that liquidity is quickly 
evaporated, available cash is withdrawn from banks and forcing banks to sell other 
investments to offset the deficit. 
According to Hull (2012), the financial crisis was triggered in 2006, as a result of the 
breakdown of credit institutions in the United States (US), which granted high risk 
mortgage loans, leading several banks to insolvency and impacting heavily on stock 
exchanges worldwide.  
The financial crisis was revealed to the public in February 2007. With the exposure to 
housing market, it led to a gross reduction in market liquidity of these assets and 
generalized increase in risk premiums; causing tensions in the interbank market, as 
referred by Hull (2012). The crisis spread rapidly from the United States to other 
countries, including Portugal and from financial markets to the real economy. 
Leary (2009) point out that the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a renowned global bank, 
in September 2008 almost brought down the world´s financial system.  The financial 
crisis has compromised liquidity; in fact the values of securities in the market were 
falling. Credit becomes harder to obtain and most firms expect to reduce their dividend 
payments and repurchase less stocks.  
Gorton (2012) and Gorton and Metrick (2012) have supported the idea that the financial 
crisis that happened in 2008 was a liquidity crisis.  Ryan (2012), states that financial 
crisis could be the great opportunities to firms strategically participate and rationalize 
changes on their dividend payout. Further he states that when firms feel that they have 
less cash liquidity it could limit the capacity to maintain their current dividend policies. 
Therefore, companies can argue that they need to reduce their dividend payout to 
guarantee that they will be able to deal with financial crisis without problem. On the 
other hand, they could decide to increase their dividend payout in order to make their 
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investors comfortable and reinforce their confidence, while the stock prices were 
depressed. 
In Europe in general, and the euro area in particularly, among the countries that were 
most contaminated by the financial crisis over the past are Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland 
and Greece.  
During the financial crisis period, the business cycle was increasingly marked by false 
expectations created in major’s international markets and quickly causing major 
difficulties in the investment and in the funding level of companies. However, financial 
instability was a cause to change the policy followed by companies and particularly 
increase and/or improve the performance of the variables that were linked to the 
economic-financial capacity in order to generate more cash flows and sustain 
consequent dividend payment.  
Firms can retain its free cash flow, either investing or accumulating it, or pay it out 
through a dividend or share repurchase. The choice between these options is determined 
by the firm’s payout police as stated by Hillier et al. (2010). The most significant 
method for distributing cash from the firm to shareholders is via cash dividend. On the 
other hand, stock dividends represent additional stock given to actual shareholders to 
increase the number of shares held by the existing shareholders. Berk and DeMarzo 
(2011) argue that dividend policy is one of the most important parts of the firm’s long-
run financing strategies and still remains as one of the great puzzles in finance. 
 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) model has become the gold standard of dividend theory. 
The progress on the field of dividend theory occurred when the authors on their seminal 
academic paper illustrated that, under perfect capital market (PCM) and rational 
investors the dividend policy is irrelevant and does not create or destroys value to the 
shareholder. Under perfect capital market, the following conditions are assumed: 
 Information is costless and available to everyone equally.  
 Transaction costs do not exist. 
 No conflict of interest between managers and shareholders; 
 No taxes exists 
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However, real world financial markets do not come close to satisfying the strict 
condition of PCM by M&M.  Therefore Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959) emphasize 
that in an absence of PCM conditions we cannot refuse the possibility that dividend 
policy is relevant. In other words, dividend policy may have impact on the wealth of the 
shareholder.  
Lintner (1956)and Gordon (1959) argue that the cost of capital of the company 
increases as the dividend decreases, because investors are less sure of receiving future 
capital gains than to receive current dividends. So these capital gains result from the 
reinvestment of the profits. However, literature considers that investors prefer 
dividends. Thus current dividend would be less risky than capital gains. Further Lintner 
(1956) supported that the main indicator of a firm’s capacity to pay dividend its 
previous dividend payment as it is and assumed that management would more likely to 
maintain a stable dividend policy. 
Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) corroborate with arguments of Gordon and Lintner. They 
claim that investors will only be available to replace a current income right for an 
uncertain future if it is necessarily superior. Thus, if companies adopt low dividend 
policy rates, investors can prefer to sell the shares if they are not satisfied with the 
dividend policy applied by the company and this behaviour can lead to a fall in stock 
prices. According to these arguments it is reasonable to assume that dividend payment 
reduces uncertainty about future cash flows; a high payout ratio will reduce the cost of 
capital.  Fisher (1961) got a similar finding - he argues that dividends have greater 
impact on firm share prices than retained earnings. 
Literature provides some empirical characteristics that distinguish firms that pay 
dividends from those who do not. Fama and French (2001) provide an excellent 
comprehensive survey of “why dividends have been disappearing?” They used firm’s 
characteristic variables, such as profitability, investment opportunities and size of the 
firm; they found out that the percentage of firms which paid cash dividend decreased 
from 67% in 1978 to 21% in 1999.  Their results also suggest that the variables above 
mentioned seem to affect the decision to pay dividends. Another reason pointed out by 
the authors about this reduction is that the companies started dividend payments as an 
attempt to compensate investors for the fact that the dividends were never distributed, 
when they did not have capacity to continue distributing it.  They concluded that the 
Impact of the Financial crisis on Dividend Payout 
 
  
5 
 
main reason for this reduction “is due in part to the changing characteristics of public 
traded companies that have never paid dividend”, Fama and French (2001, p.3).  In 
summary, their results reveal that lately companies have become less likely to pay 
dividends and those that never paid dividends feared and began to pay it, because they 
are more profitable than those that have been paying dividends. They also concluded 
that larger firms with high profitability and low growth rates tend to pay dividends 
while low-profit and higher growth rates firms try to retain earnings. 
Evidence of the dividend abandonment phenomenon is also documented by Denis and 
Osobov (2008), who examine the dividend payment over 1994-2002 in Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US.  They reported that, although the magnitude of the 
decline in propensity to pay dividend differs across the six countries, the fraction of 
dividend-payers always shows a downward trend. Despite this decline, the probability 
of paying dividends is associated with the firm’s characteristic theory suggested by 
Fama and French (2001); they also found out that in all countries, the likelihood of 
paying dividend is strongly associated with the ratio of retained earnings to total equity.  
The fraction of firms that pays dividends is high when firm’s equity consists primarily 
of retained earnings and is low when retained earnings are negative. This finding is 
consistent with the theory of maturity from DeAngelo et al. (2006) that argue that firms 
with financial stability are more likely to pay dividends because they have higher 
profitability and fewer attractive investment opportunities. The authors observe a highly 
significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed 
capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balance 
and dividend history. They report that the disappearing dividend is larger than the one 
reported by Fama and French (2001). 
Grullon et al.(2002) use the theory of maturity to argument that the dividend conveys 
information to the outside the marginal information that only managers have.   They 
suggested that increases in dividend convey information about changes in a firm’s life 
cycle, specifically, as to the firm’s transition from a higher growth phase to a lower 
growth phase, which they call as a mature phase. When firms become more mature, 
their investment opportunities set becomes smaller. They used systematic risk as key 
variables to define firm`s maturity. They refer that mature firms have more capacity to 
pay dividends, because they have less risk. They establish that dividend changes are 
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accompanied by changes in systematic risk and the increase in dividends leads to a 
decline in the firm’s systematic risk. On the other hand, Xu and Malkiel (2003) point 
out that the increased specific risk of the firm reflects the potential growth of firms in 
the future, indicating that firms with an increase risk may decrease their dividend 
payment for future growth. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) examine disappearing 
dividends puzzle through the risk perspective. They find that risk is a significant 
determination of the propensity to pay dividends in the US and it could explain 
approximately 40% of the disappearing dividends. 
Firms adopt the optimal dividend policy in accordance with the evolution of their 
opportunity set. Young firms pay fewer dividends as their investment opportunities 
exceed their internally generated capital, so they retain cash as an alternative of 
distribution of dividend to shareholders. However, mature firms pay more dividends to 
mitigate the possibility of free cash flows being wasted due to internal funds exceeding 
investment opportunities. 
 
Salminen (2008) reported that in an economically troubled time, most of the investors 
assume that dividends are more important, especially high dividend companies are 
assumed to be valued higher during recession time. Ryan (2012) stated that normally 
these kinds of companies’ increase dividend payout over time to convey a really good 
value of companies.  
Smits (2012) analyses the impact of the recent financial crisis on US firm’s dividend 
payout policy, using variables like size, liquidity, investor composition and spread of 
bid/ask. Overall his findings show that the financial crisis did not affect dividend payout 
ratios, despite the evidence that dividend payout increases during crisis for larger firms 
with higher percentage of institutional owners. The author argued that maybe the firm 
wants to communicate to their shareholders that the crisis does not affect the firm too 
much as it does with others, in order to convey information that a firm is still strong. 
Hauser (2013) uses models proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006) to investigate whether 
corporate payout policy changed during the financial crisis in the US between 2006 to 
2009. He found out that the likelihood of paying dividends was reduced in 2008 and 
2009. This reduction on dividend payment was statistically significant at 1 percent. He 
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also point out that an average probability of dividend cut increased from 13.6 percent in 
2006 to 32.1 percent in 2009. 
Banerjee et al. (2007) found that the liquidity could in part take account for the changes 
in dividend-payers. Meanwhile, rational investors prefer firms with high liquidity and 
they usually ask for high discount rates when evaluating firms with low liquidity.  In 
market with low liquidity, the high transaction cost inclines investors to receive 
dividends rather than get the same amount of homemade dividend by selling their 
investment. 
Fatemi and Bildik (2012) use data from a large sample for more than 17000 firms to 
investigate the pattern in dividend payments in 33 different countries over the 1985-
2006 periods. They found out a substantial variation in the propensity to pay dividend at 
the global level. Nevertheless, the common tendency across all these markets is a 
decline to pay dividend. They argue that this decline is persistent and consistent over 
sub-periods and across all 33 countries and it seems that dividend is disappearing. They 
justified this decline with the evolution of stock markets around the world, because their 
preference to become more developed and better capable of facilitating the investor’s 
preferences to switch their investment allocations among corporations, and the 
expanded opportunities made available to firms for the sale and repurchase of their 
shares, has played a significant role in reducing the importance attached to the dividend 
by corporate sector. They also find that larger firms with higher profitability and lower 
growth opportunities have a bigger propensity to pay dividends.  This finding is 
consistent with Fama and French (2001) 
Lease et al. (1999, p.81) cit. in Easterbrook (1984), refer that firms with low leverage, 
the payment of dividends will have little impact on the value of the debt. When the firm 
is highly leveraged, every dollar counts and dividend payments can greatly increase the 
risk of debt. Incentive for shareholders to pay dividends is stronger when their firm´s 
leverage is high than when it is low. He argues that dividend payments force managers 
to raise funds in the financial markets more frequently than they would without paying 
dividends. Firms with high leverage also are those where value shifting is potentially 
costly. He expects those firms to pay larger dividend.  His analyses suggest a positive 
relationship between leverage and dividend payout. 
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In a market characterized by asymmetric information, a change in dividend policy is 
considered by many authors as one of the ways used by managers to convey to the 
outside this marginal information only they have.  
Many previous authors investigated the dividend signaling effects and provided 
supports to the role of dividend payout as signals to the market participants (e.g. Gurgul 
et al.(2003), Ross (1977), Bhattacharya (1979), Bozos et al.(2011)). Actually Ross 
(1977)develops a one-period incentive signalling  model in the context of capital 
structure; supposing that managers have private information about the firm´s future cash 
flows.  Bhattacharya (1979) takes Ross (1977) model  and structured it in a two period 
and shows that under conditions where outside investors have imperfect information 
about firms’ changes on dividends transmit the information to managements about 
future prospects to the market.  His model contains the main argument that dividend 
payment is a costly signal, and thus only good firms that have the funds for it, can 
declare them. Therefore, firms with pessimistic prospects are not capable of using 
dividends to convey such a signal. This argument result that managers in order to attract 
some investors with goal to obtain financing for new projects, convey false information 
to signalize the market prospectus for future growth. This information could cost a lot to 
companies, if they do not have money to meet the expectations, management may ask 
for financing to homer their commitments to pay dividends. That financing leads to a 
cost of signalling (e.g. cost relating to a greater differential in interest rates and 
transaction costs for such funding). The author refers these differentials as dissipative 
costs. 
Bozos et al.(2011) investigated dividend signalling under economic adversity, using 
London stock data from 2007 to 2008. Theirs finds reveal that information content of 
dividend varies with stage of the economy situations, there is less than earning in the 
period of economic stability but more than earnings in the period of crisis, thus 
supporting the role of dividend as a signal from management in bad financial times. 
The most of the studies on dividends policy associated with financial crisis and other 
aspects of dividend disappearing is listed on the following table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 – Similar studies  
Most of the previous studies regarding determinants of firms dividend polices during 
financial crisis have been conducted in the United States. Studies are presented in 
chronological order and the results are also presented. 
Author (s) of 
study 
Parameter examined  Sample Main Finding 
Fama and French 
(2001)  
 
 
Disappearing dividends: 
changing firm characteristic 
or lower propensity to pay? 
 
1926 - 1999 
The percentage of firms which 
paid cash dividend decreased 
around from 67% in 1978 to 
21% in 1999.  
Denis and 
Osobov (2008)  
Why do firms pay Dividends: 
International evidence on the 
determinants of dividends 
policy 
1994 - 2002 The fraction of dividend-payers 
shows a downward trend. 
Smits, R. (2012) Effects of the financial crisis 
on the dividend pay-out 
policy of the firm. 
2005- 2010  
 
The crisis did not affect 
dividend pay-out ratios. He 
found that dividends increase 
during the crisis for larger firms. 
Hauser, R. 
(2013) 
Change of dividend policy 
during the financial crisis. 
2006-2009 The likelihood of paying 
dividends is reduced in 2008 
and 2009.The reduction is 
statistically significant at 1 
percent in 2009. Dividend 
policy changed during the 
financial crisis. 
Despite of a wide range of studies concerning dividend payout, we have not found studies in Portugal 
which concentrated only dividend payout during the financial crisis. We could not either find many 
articles on dividend payout related to the financial crisis. 
 
The aim of the next chapter is to explain how we are going to conduct the research. The 
first part of the chapter will discuss the sampling process. We will thereafter discuss 
how we collected the variables and processed the necessary hypothesis in order to 
answer our research question.  
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3. Data description and hypotheses development  
This chapter we do data description and framing research questions to be developed. 
3.1 Sample selection and data description  
 
This subsection briefly describes the construction of our sample and key variables.  All 
data used in this study are annual and covers firms listed on 29th May 2014 on PSI-20 
that have announced any change on dividends payout from fiscal years 2005 to 2012, 
which cover the financial crisis period from 2008.  
In this study index analysis is PSI-20, which represents the twenty mostly liquid 
companies in Portugal.  We follows Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) our analysis will not fall on the five financial institutions since the rules and 
forms of financing that apply are significantly different from non-financial mainly, 
restrictions on capital structure imposed by Basel agreements. Thus, the sample 
included non-financial companies listed on PSI-20, with the exception of EDP- 
Renovaveis, because it is owned 77.5% by EDP-Energia de Portugal, being substituted 
by Brisa that just left in this index in August 2012, REN, SonaeCom and Sonae 
Industria do not have record of dividend payment during three consecutive years.  These 
requirements result in 12 non-financial companies, which are listed in appendix-1that 
provides all the information about the main variables for study also figured in table 3.2. 
The sample is constructed using DataStream, and all the data are collected via Faculty 
of Economic of University of Porto, firm´s annual reports for the period 2005-2012  and 
Securities Commission (CMVM) site, and processed through the Gretl Software.  The 
choice of these programs is all due to their recent use in the academic world statistical 
analysis since it gives the great informational consistency. 
                  Table 3.1 Sample Selection 
Firms  listed on PSI20             20 
financial institutions 
data of dividend distribution 
   5 
   3 
Observation after elimination            12 
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Table 3.2 – Description of the variables used in Analysis 
 symbol Description Signal 
    
Dividend payout Div Dividend cash   N/A 
Market to Book 
Ratio 
Mtb Market capitalization divide by book value of 
equity 
+/- 
Firm size Log(Size) Logarithm of assets + 
Log dividend 
lagged 
Div(1-t) 
Is equal to the dividend paid last year Div(1-t) 
+ 
Leverage Lev Total liabilities divide by shareholders equity +/- 
Risk Beta The relationship between the return of a stock i 
and the return of a market 
- 
Quick ratio Qr 
Ratio between quick assets to currents 
liabilities. 
+ 
Dummy 2008 dum2008 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
firms change their dividend payout in 2008 and 
the value 0 otherwise.  
N/A 
Dummy 2009 dum2009 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
firms change their dividend payout in 2009 and 
the value 0 otherwise.  
N/A 
Dummy 2010 dum2010 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
firms change their dividend payout in 2010 and 
the value 0 otherwise.  
N/A 
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3.2 Variables and hypotheses development 
The dependents and independents variables used in the regression are based on 
assumptions of the authors referenced in the literature review. 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable  
 
In literature there are several variables to measure the dividend policy for example: 
dividend payout ratio, dividend yield and dividend payout. In the present research, the 
choice of variable which allows measuring the impact of the financial crisis falls on 
firm’s dividend payout (Div) in year t. In order to examine whether listed companies on 
PSI- 20 change their dividend payments due to the financial crisis, the following 
hypothesis is developed. 
Does the impact of the financial crisis on dividend payout? 
3.2.2 Independent variables  
 
The independent variables included in this study are variables identified in previous 
literature related to the dividend payout. 
Mature firms are likely to be presented with fewer opportunities and also are likely to be 
in a position to generate free cash flows which may be distributed as dividend to 
shareholders. DeAngelo et al .(2006) considered   market to book ratio (Mtb) as a proxy of 
investment opportunities measure; authors argue that firms that have higher investment 
opportunities and less free cash are less likely to distribute dividends. Lower investment 
opportunities lead to lower external financing needs and consequently result in a higher 
likelihood of dividend payments.  Therefore we expected a negative relation between 
investment opportunities and dividend payout. 
H1: Dividend Payout is negatively associated with firm market to book ratio. 
Fama and French (2001) note that firm size plays a role in explaining the dividend 
payout of firms.  They found that larger firms tend to be more mature and they have 
easier access to the capital markets, which permits reduce their dependence on 
internally funding and allows for high dividend payout ratio. They also state that larger 
firms have less information asymmetry, but they have a lot of cash flows and lower 
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financing costs. Authors use market capitalization percentile as a proxies of firm Size. We 
use logarithm of the book assets as proxies of firm size variables. We predict positive 
relationship between dividend payout with firm size. 
H2: Dividend payout is positively associated with firm size. 
Lease et al. (1999) emphasizes that dividend payments make managers to raise funds in 
the financial markets more frequently than they would without paying dividends. Firms 
with high financial leverage (Lev) also are firm that any change of the value is 
potentially costly.  His analysis suggests a positive relationship between Lev and 
dividend payout. In contrast to them we think in Portugal higher level of the debt would 
be the reason to companies do not distributed dividend. The companies with higher 
degree of debt in its capital structure discloser larger risk and as a result higher interest 
expenses with the debt service.  In this case we predict a negative relation between Lev 
and dividend payout. 
H3: Dividend payout is negatively associated with financial leverage. 
The volatility of the stock price in the context of the recent financial crisis has been 
concerning the market participants. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) found that dividend 
changes are accompanied by changes in systematic risk. Authors use standard deviation 
of the predicted values as a measure of the systematic risk.   
We follow Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) using eight-year daily prices and the 
proportional change for all 12 companies firms listed on PSI20 and the PSI20 returns, 
which we take as proxy for the stock market as a whole. In order to determine the 
riskiness of the stocks we used beta which describes the relationship between the return 
of a stock and the return of a market. Therefore we had to calculate the historical beta 
manually for each company listed on PSI20. When calculating the historical beta we 
used the formula provided by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). We predict negative 
relationship between Beta and dividend payout. 
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                     equation      (3.2.1) 
Where: 
ri = Return on stock i 
rm = Market return  
H4: Dividend payout is negatively associated with beta. 
Liquidity is ability of a firm to meet its obligations and recurring operating expenses, 
such as dividend payout. Several ratios provide information on liquidity.  We follow 
Smits (2012), who’s use Quick (acid-test) ratio as a proxy of the liquidity. Author 
shows that the firms with less liquid have less probability to meet its obligations. In the 
quick ratio, the numerator includes quick assets (cash, short-term marketable securities, 
and accounts receivable). The denominator consists of current liabilities. We expect 
positive relationship between dividend payout and Quick ratio as a liquidity measure. 
H5: Dividend payout is positively associated with liquidity. 
We also include dummy variable in regression in order to investigate the impact of the 
financial crisis. We have taken 2005 as base year; we considered dum2008, dum2009, 
dum2010 (equal to one if the observation was in, 2008, 2009 and 2010 years, and zero 
otherwise). 
In the next section we provide a summary of the methodological considerations and 
assumptions fundamental the research process. 
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4. Methodology  
 4.1 Model  
In this study we use multivariate analysis to expect the impact of financial crisis on 
dividend payout an approach to panel data model. In the first place, we transform 
dividend cash and book assets into logarithm, in order to make a good interpretation of 
coefficients and to try eliminating possible heteroscedasticity that would exist in the 
model. The basic form of the model is as follow: 
 
                                                            
                    +     
Equation 1- (Model.1) 
Where, 
i = 12 firms: Altri, Brisa, Cofina, EDP energias, Galp Energias, J. Martins. M. Engil, 
Portucel, PT. Telecom, Semapa, Sonae SGPS and Zon Optimus; t= 8 years: 2005-2012. 
                       regression coefficients; 
            - dependent variable; 
                                       and            - independent variables 
and;      term includes other factors that may influence the dividend payout. 
Assuming that the model mentioned above is well specified, the main objective is to 
analyse the specific effects of the financial crisis that began in 2008. We follow Hauser 
(2013) and we introduced the dummies variables for three years in model (1) in order to 
capture which years of financial crisis dividend suffer change. 
 
                                                                    
                                                 
                              
Equation 2- (Model.1) 
Where  
dum2008, dum2009 and dum2010 are defined as time dummy variable that considers 
the financial crisis beginning in the year 2008 until 2010, inclusive. 
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The main objective of this dissertation is to test the null hypothesis that had not suffered 
from impact of the financial crisis on dividend payout. 
 
          for 2008 
          for 2009 
          for 2010 
 
against alternative 
 hypothesis 
          for 2008 
          for 2009 
          for 2010 
 
 
If we reject the null hypothesis for any of the years, based on the T-Statistic and β 
estimated, obtained by usual regressions we can conclude that the financial crisis has 
impact on dividend policy. 
The dynamic economic relations suggest that the current behaviour depends on its past. 
As referred by Lintner (1956), the historical dividend trend is significant enough to 
influence the current dividend payment. We took out the variable with less significance 
and we include the dividend payout of the previous year           as independent 
variables in our model. The model takes form as follow: 
 
                                                           
                          +    
Equation 3 (Model. 2) 
Where, 
         is a lagged dividend variable. 
After the theoretical presentation of how impact of the financial crisis on dividend 
payout should be modelled, we analyse the data and investigate the economic relations 
that may explain what influences the dividend payout, and take into account many 
factors – economic, financial, etc. In this context, models of panel data are presented as 
the method par excellence for analysing the impact of financial crisis since it allows the 
inclusion of several variables, which characterize the different factors mentioned and of 
reduced time series, featuring our study. 
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4.2 Panel data models 
 
4.2.1 Panel data models overview 
 
According to Gujarati (2006), the use of panel data has advantages because it takes into 
account the occurrence of temporal and longitudinal variations. Moreover, by using 
temporal data sectional, the number of observations increases and consequently 
increases of the number of degrees of freedom as well, allowing a reduction of the 
collinearity. Second Greene (2012) noted that there are some limitations on panel data 
usage the design of the database the distortion caused by the error measures, the 
selection problems of the series and the size of the time series.  There is also additional 
data due to heterogeneity of data, because the companies have different economic 
structures, which complicates the model estimation process, Marques (2000). 
To simplify, we will assume that models (1 and 2) related in previous section are given 
by the following generic model. 
                     ,                equation (4) 
 
Where i=1, 2, 3 … N companies and t=1, 2, 3...T time periods 
In panel data model,    represents the individual effects of each firm which are constant 
over time,   is transposed matrix represents the individual marginal effects of each firm 
and    is the error term. 
According to Greene (2012), the panel data models may have different specifications, 
such as Pooled, fixed effects and random effects. 
                                                 equation (4.1) 
                                                 equation (4.2) 
                with               equation (4.3) 
Where        represent vectors of parameters. 
In the specification of the pooled panel data model consideration that equation (4),   
and    is common to the different companies and the firms have the same intercepts and 
the index of the variable disappears. Thus the equation (4) should be rewrites as it 
present the equation (4.1) and can be estimated by the least squares method ordinary 
(OLS - Ordinary Least Squares). 
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The major problem of this model is that it does not distinguish the various companies 
listed on PSI20. By combining all the companies by pooling, it rejected the 
heterogeneity or individuality that may exist among them. 
In the specification of panel data with fixed effect model whereas the equation (4),      
is considered common to the firms that constitute the panel and     different for all the 
firms. Thus the index of the variable disappears. As a result the equation (4) has been 
rewrite as it presents the equation (4. 2). 
Finally, in specification of the panel data model  with random effect, taking into account 
the equation (4),    it is assumed that are independent of errors     and also assume that 
   and     are independently distributed, the errors take the form of            and 
the equation (4) has been rewritten as it presents the (4.3). 
 
4.2.2 Panel diagnostic  
Testing the model specification is used to analyse effects that are present in the data 
panel. In this sense, to find which model is adequate between fixed effects and pooled, 
we use the Pooled test.  According to Watson (2012, p.403) this test is also known as F-
test.  
               
                   
                  
 
 Equation (5) 
Where 
                are sum of the squares of the residues of pooled and fixed model, 
respectively. 
      and           are the degrees of freedom, where N is the number of 
firms, T is the  number of period and  K is the number of variables we have in our study. 
The null hypothesis (Ho) is pooled against alternative Hypothesis (H1) fixed effects. 
According Marques (2000) is very important to choose one of these models, because 
they can generate different estimated coefficients. The fixed effect model permits 
heterogeneity or individuality among all the twelve companies that we have in our 
sample. The term fixed in this case refers to the fact that the intercept may differ across 
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companies, but it does not vary over time.  We use Hausman test to select which model 
fit better our sample. 
Hausman test for fixed effect model versus random effects model (Watson 2012, p. 421): 
   ( ̂    ̂  )
 
[   ( ̂  )       ̂   ]
  
( ̂    ̂  )   
   
Equation (6)
 
Where,  
 ̂   – is the vector of estimators of the model with fixed effects; 
 ̂    is the vector of estimators of the model with random effects; 
   ( ̂  )   is the matrix of variances-covariance of the estimators  ̂  ; 
   ( ̂  )   is the matrix of variances-covariance of the estimators  ̂  ; 
   Number of regression coefficients. 
If H>  
 or p-value< 0.05, rejected null hypothesis that the random effect model is 
adequate against alternative hypothesis (fixed effects). 
Figure-4.1: The process of estimating the static and dynamic panel data model 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Author 
 
PANEL DATA 
Fixed effects model 
Pooled Model 
(OLS)Random 
effectsModel (OLS or 
FGLS) Dynamic Model 
Fixed effect Models 
(LSDV) and FD 
 
Yes 
No 
No Yes 
Homoscedasticity – Pagan –Hall test 
Method Two Stage 
Least Square (TSLS) 
Generalized Methods 
of Moments (GMM) 
Yes No 
Impact of the Financial crisis on Dividend Payout 
 
  
20 
 
5. Empirical results  
 
In this chapter we are going to assess the impact of the financial crisis on companies’ 
dividend payout, therefore showing an empirical work which is dividend in three 
sections. In the first section the main descriptive statistics for the overall samples are 
analysed in order to realise the evolution of dividend payout during the period 2005-
2012.In the second, we would analyse the critical assumptions of the regression model 
and in the third section we will end up with the discussion of the results. 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Table 5.1 - Descriptive statistics 
These tables provide the value of mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and 
maximum. The data set contained a total of 96 observations for 12 Portuguese 
companies over a period of 8 years for 6 variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  A 
 Log(Div)    Mtb Log(Size) Beta     Lev Qr 
 Mean 10.661 2.67677 15.053 0.8771 5.8830 0.78167 
St. Dev 2.3094 1.85504 1.2964 0.3173 8.7009 0.48655 
Median 11.090 2.34500 15.116 0.8800 3.6122 0.66500 
Min 4.6308 -1.84000 11.826 0.08000 0.8136 0.21000 
Maximum 14.188  8.30000 17.560 1.67000 65.551 3.0800 
N  90 96 96     96 96 96 
 
 
 
 
  B 
 Log (div)     Mtb Log( Size)      Beta      Lev Qr 
 Mean 10.561 2.7678 14.874 0.83972 3.5046 0.8558 
St. Dev 2.1953 1.7666 1.2665 0.43303 2.1277 0.4555 
Median 10.975 2.5050 15.006 0.77500 3.3631 0.7200 
Min 5.5428 0.6800 12.276 0.08000 1.0032 0.2800 
Maximum 13.273 8.300 17.243 1.6700 8.7196 2.2600 
N  35 36 36 36 36 36 
 
 
    C 
 Mean 10.7253 2.6222 15.159 0.8995 6.6443 0.7372 
St. Dev 2.39693 1.9800 1.3128 0.2223 9.1755 0.5027 
Median 11.1232 1.9187 14.100 0.91000 4.0722 0.6550 
Min 4.63084 -1.8400 11.826 0.43000 0.8136 0.2100 
Maximum 14.1884 6.7700 17.560 1.34000 65.551 3.0800 
 N 55 60 60 60 60 60 
 
The sample was divided into three panels the years of namely, Panel – A (2005-2012) 
representing the overall sample, panel-B (2005-2007) referring to the period before the 
financial crisis and, panel C (2008-2012) which correspond to the years of the financial 
crisis. The descriptive statistics for the OLS can be seen in table above. This table 
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allows us to understand the distribution of values that constitute the variables. As it can 
be seen the means of all six variables included in this study are very close to their 
median, therefore implying that the sample data tends to the average. It is also reveals 
that the data is normally distributed (panel-A).  The maximum and minimum values of 
all variables have got a reasonable difference except for financial leverage ratio. The 
standard deviation of leverage ratio is the highest whereas the quick ratio variables 
experience the lowest standard deviation. 
According to dependents variables for entire sample (panel-A) from 2005 to 2012, on 
average companies 10.7 of dividend payout, while the median value indicates that 50% 
of the samples in our study show a dividend equal or above 10.10. When we compare 
the perspectives before financial crisis and after financial crisis, the dividends have just 
a little different outlook. Whilst in that of after crisis the dividend payout increase 0.2% 
(table 5.1); this is obviously due to the fact that the companies in our sample have 
distributed extraordinary and anticipated dividend. 
The two largest differences compared to standard deviation are panel-B and Panel-C. 
The standard deviation is very high which indicates that difference between the two 
periods is large and also the financial leverage variables is exceptionally high in the 
years of the crisis and we think that is partly due to the unstable financial environment 
during the time period.   
Graphs 5.1 - Annual variation of the payout, earnings and ROE of the PSI 20 companies 
 
According to chart 5.1 we can see that 2010 was the year when companies distributed 
large amounts of dividend. This progress is explained by the increase in the payout ratio 
of the 60% in comparison with 2009 and the increase in company results which 
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contributed toward the increase in the distribution of dividends. However, the 
performance of the value of the earnings was not constant throughout the financial crisis 
period. The average value of the earnings the all non-financial companies on PSI20 
registered a decrease in the value under beginning of the crisis. Moreover, companies in 
our sample were marked by high volatility, the stock prices dropped, consequently 
leading to losses in market capitalization (See graph 5.2).  
The market-to-book ratio also decreased in comparison with 2008, due to the effect 
produced by the drop in stock price. This drop could be explained by the factors that 
were related to the Portuguese capital market, the adoption of restrictive measures of 
economic policy and the contagion effect suffered by the Greek sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Graph 5.2: variation of the price, market to book ratio and volatility  
 
We predict that the market-to-book value should be lower during the financial crisis. As 
we can see in graphs 5.1 and 5.2 the increase/decrease in dividend payout is 
corresponding to increase/decrease in market-to-book ratio value respectively. More 
especially, where Mtb value fall down in 2008, the total dividend cash and reaches peak 
in 2009. Thus, on the basis of these charts, the decrease/increase market-to-book value 
could have an indication for the decreasing and increasing dividend payout, 
respectively. The Mtb value in 2008 has a negative influence on the total dividend 
payout in 2009. 
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The correlation matrix displays that there exist reasonable relationship between all 
variables. The variance-covariance among variables is not too high. 
 
Table 5.2 - Correlations between Key Variables 
 
From the table 5.2we can see that we did not find any strong correlation between the 
independent variables, being the strongest correlation equal to 0.3059 between firm 
assets and riskiness (Beta).In advantaged it can be seen that our model presents absence 
of the multicollinearity.  
5.2 Models Test 
 
Before analysing the multivariate regression model, the consistency of the model was 
tested through several regression assumptions.Gujarati (2006) teaches us that there are 
four critical assumptions for a regression model: collinearity, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. 
Before we start the analysis of the regression assumptions mentioned above, we run an 
equation by Ordinary Square linear (OLS) model to check the features
1
 of the good 
regressions. The results are presented on appendix 2. 
                                                          
 1  Regression line must be fitted to data strongly; 
 Most of independent variables should be individually significant to explain dividend pay-out;´ 
 Given independents variables should be jointly significant  to explain or influence dividend pay-
out; 
 No serial or autocorrelation in the residual (     and variable of the     should be constant, 
meaning homoscedastic and 
 The (     should be normally distributed. 
 
Log(size) Mtb Beta Lev Qr Dtimes  
1.0000 -0.1474 0.3059 -0.2925 0.0752 0.0469 Log(size) 
 1.0000 -0.0946 0.0397 -0.2854 0.0063 Mtb 
  1.0000 -0.0222 -0.0978 0.1659 Beta 
   1.0000 0.0190 0.1236 Lev 
    1.0000 -0.0849 Qr 
     1.0000 Dtimes 
Impact of the Financial crisis on Dividend Payout 
 
  
24 
 
From estimation we can see that the elasticity of coefficients is well determined by 
conventional standards. There is individual statistical significance of the majority 
independent variables at the level of 99% (***), except financial leverage variables that 
not present significance. Also, there is statistical significance of the overall model for 
the p-value (F) is less than 0.05. This is consistent with Smits (2012) and Fama and 
French (2001). Thus we reject the null hypothesis that our independents variables do not 
influence the dividend payout.  In this model we can see that the determination 
coefficient (R-squared) has a value superior (0.74) which is quite good, meaning that 
the model is nicely fitted. Switching words, the independent variables in the model 
explain more than 74% of the dividend payout. 
We also used Ramseys’s Reset test to assess the specification of our model for the 
period 2005-2012. The null hypothesis is that our model is adequate.  There is a good 
specification. The alternative is that it is not. Since the P-Value of the test is less than 
0.05 (see appendix 2) we reject null hypothesis, which is not desirable. The model 
should be adequate. This could be due to the sample size, the amount of variables in the 
model or even to the sheer form of the variables. 
The Variation Inflation Factor (VIF)
2
is use as collinearity diagnostic, refers Adkin, 
(2013). He suggested that the benchmark limit is 10. Thus, when the VIF present a 
value higher than 10 we are in the presence of multicollinearity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2     
 
    
  , variance inflation factor actually reports the same information with   
 , but in a less 
straightforward way.  
Impact of the Financial crisis on Dividend Payout 
 
  
25 
 
The results are shown in the following table 5.3. 
5.3. Variance Inflation Factors  
 
R    1-   VIF 
Mtb, Size -0.15 0.02 0.98 1.02 
 Mtb, Beta  0.09 0.01 0.99 1.01 
 Mtb, Lev  0.04 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 Mtb, Qr  -0.29 0.08 0.92 1.09 
 Mtb, Dtimes  0.05 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 Size, Beta  0.31 0.09 0.91 1.10 
 Size, Lev  -0.29 0.09 0.91 1.09 
 Size, Qr  0.08 0.01 0.99 1.01 
 Size, Dtimes  0.05 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 Beta, Lev  -0.02 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 Beta, Qr  -0.10 0.01 0.99 1.01 
 Beta, Dtimes  0.17 0.03 0.97 1.03 
 Lev, Qr  0.02 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 Lev, Dtimes  0.12 0.02 0.98 1.02 
 Qr, Dtimes  -0.08 0.01 0.99 1.01 
 
We find that there is no collinearity between the variables of the model because the 
VIF’s are within the benchmark values, as we had referred to when we were doing the 
analysis of the correlation matrix. 
Wooldridge (2012) states that heteroscedasticity is a term used to define the situation 
when the variance of the residuals is not constant for all individuals.  The white 
heteroscedasticity test was run for the residuals to check if the model is healthy or not. 
As we can see in appendix 2, we have a P-value of (0.14) which is more than 5 percent; 
therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Meaning, that the residual is 
homoscedasticity, as wanted. 
Gujarati (2006), state that the most models have assumed that qualitative variables 
affect the intercept and not the slope coefficient of the regression sub group. Testing the 
differences of the intercepts can result in a misrepresentation of the results when the 
slopes are different.The structural changes happen when we split our sample into two 
sub periods N1 and N2, for example data before crisis and after crisis, and we 
estimating parameters for each sub periods and then testing the equality of the two sets 
of the parameters. The structural changes have being tested by the Chow test. Once 
again we look at the p-value (0.0006) see appendix 2. We reject the null hypothesis, 
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which means that the model does not represent structural changes. This issue is 
classically linked to the sample size. 
Since we have a panel dataset and the conditions of regressions are being covered. It is 
necessary to test out which modelling technique is adequate for analysing our sample. 
So, we applied the panel diagnosis tests. The Hausman test was run to determine the use 
of fixed effect model or random effects model. This test explores the consistency of the 
random effects estimator. The null hypothesis which is a random effect model against 
the alternative hypothesis which is a fixed effect model, the results obtained by the 
Hausman test, as shown in the table present on the appendix-3, show that the p-value 
calculated is less than 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis which suggest that the 
random effects estimator is consistent. Therefore we will estimate our model using a 
fixed effects approach. Since our sample is small, it is natural that some issues may 
arise in the model; nevertheless, and from an Economic point of the view, we will cover 
every aspect that we think plausible, so our results are the most consistent possible. 
5.3 Multivariate results 
 
The model estimation was made by using Gretl program. The dataset is a panel dataset 
with information regarding 12 companies for the period 2005-2012; we started by re-
estimate the model under the assumptions of the fixed effects specifications. 
5.3.1  Static panel data model 
 
Regarding explanatory variables of the dividend policy, defined in the previous chapter, 
the fixed effects estimation of static model can be presented by the following equation: 
                                                             
                    +     
 
We begin the analysis of the regression model (I) by computing fixed effect estimates of 
the parameters. 
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Bear in mind that, as stated before, we could find negative impact of the financial crisis 
on the dividend payout. To make sure of this, we have run the model using annual 
effects aiming to capture which of the years of the financial crisis could have impact. 
                                                             
                    +                                         
 
The estimated static panel data model results are summarized in table 5.4.  
Table 5.4estimated static panel data model using fixe effect estimator model (1) 
The table reports the results from estimating the unbalanced panel fixed effects model of the PSI-20 non-
financial companies on dividend payout during the period 2005-2012. The explanatory variable is as 
defined in section 3. The t-statistic is presented as well. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, at 5% 
and 1% respectively. Standard error in parenthesis 
Variables Expect 
Sign 
Model (I) 
         OLS Fixed Effects Annual 
effects 
Const ± -7.589 
(1.7810) 
*** 
 
2.0240 
(2.0684) 
** 
 
1.9402* 
(1.8813) 
Log Size + 14.39 
(0.1134) 
*** 
 
3.2412 
(0.1477) 
*** 
 
3.8135 *** 
(0.1363) 
Mtb ± 2.844 
(0.07159) 
*** 
 
-2.5481 
(0.03009) 
** 
 
-2.8897 *** 
 (0.0273) 
Beta - -3.452 
(0.4312) 
*** 
 
      -0.3572 
      (0.29823) 
-0.4216 
  (0.2943) 
Lev ± -0.9116 
(0.00543) 
 
 
-2.26676 ** 
      (0.00439) 
-2.4534 ** 
   (0.0087) 
Qr + 1.852 
(0.268) 
* 
  
 
0.4417 
(0.1056) 
 
 
    0.5101 
   (0.1184) 
Dtimes ± 1.067 
(0.2673) 
 
 
 
 
1.0461 
(0.0988) 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
D2008 ± - - 
 
     0.15652 
      (0.1605) 
D2009 ± - - 0.6378 
(0.0776) 
D2010 ± - -       (0.1583) 
      (0.1769) 
    0.751290  
 
  
   adj  0.73331 
 
  
F-Stat  41.787   
N  90   
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According to the fixed effect model regression (equation 4.2.1) we observe:    that firm 
size is positively correlated with dividend payout at 1% level of significance. In 
addition, market–to-book values have a negative and significant influence on dividend 
payout at 5% level of significance. Our result is partially in agreement with the findings 
from preview literature, such as Smits (2012), Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) and Fama 
and French (2001). 
We also found that firm leverage have a negative and significant influence on dividend 
payout at 5% level of significance  meaning that  non-financial companies in Portugal 
have higher debt level. To a certain extent this explains the smaller return on equity for 
the shareholders (see graphs 5.1).  The companies with higher degree of debt in its 
capital structure discloser larger risk and as a result higher interest expenses with the 
debt service and consequently lower dividend payout.  
The most important variable is dummy variable. The coefficient associated with this 
variable present positive signal and insignificant. This result proposing that the financial 
crisis has no impact on dividend policy. In contrast which Hauser (2013) who’s found a 
decrease of dividend payout in 2008 and 2009 and statistically significant at 1%. Our 
finding is consistent with Smits (2012). The author found that financial crisis did not 
affect dividend payout; despite there was increase of the dividend payout by 
institutional investors. 
5.3.2 Dynamic panel data model 
 
To assess whether firms have reasonable and well defined dividend policies in terms of 
the speed which the adjust dividend towards a long run target payout ratio and to 
compare the results obtained with the application of static panel models, we took out the 
variable with less significance in previous model (1) and we introduce in it the lagged 
variables, which turns our analysis into a dynamic analysis.  
                                                               
                   +    
Where     represent heterogeneity of each firm. 
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The dynamic panel data models can have autocorrelation issues due to the presence of 
the lagged variables within the regressors side, since              is a function of the 
     and               is also a function of the      . Moreover, to fix this problem, we 
estimated the following dynamic panel data model using Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
estimator, such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
In the first estimation of the model (equation 4.2.2), when we run model by OLS to 
check model features, we found again significance in firm size, lagged dividend and 
market-to-book ratio, this could induce us a wrong results because, OLS does not 
assume individuality between the companies. From this estimation we found that  model 
present good specification, through the RESET test than model (I) it can be seen on 
(appendix 3.1) that p-value is higher than 0.05, so the model (II) is most adequate in 
comparison with model (I) and also  presented an R-Squared of 86 % (R
2
) and an 
adjusted (R
2
) of 85%.  
Table 5.5 Estimated dynamic panel data model using fixe effect estimator. 
The table reports the results from estimating the unbalanced dynamic panel fixed effects model of the 
PSI20 non-financial companies on dividend payout during the period 2005-2012. Standard error reported 
in parenthesis. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Model II – Dynamic Model 
variables Expect 
signal 
OLS levels Fixed effect GMM(SYST) 
constant ± -1.8976* 
(2.4192) 
2.2747  ** 
(6.01132) 
      -0.7940 
        (6.5039) 
Log size +  2.0426 ** 
(0.2848) 
0.4696 
(0.3295) 
     2.5191  ** 
 (0.4117) 
Mtb ± 1.8295 * 
(0.0377) 
-2.4726 ** 
(0.0486) 
      0.6185 
      (0.078) 
Beta - -1.4886 
(0.53593) 
-0.4029 
(0.3136) 
     -0.2552  
      (0.4526) 
Qr + 1.6299 
(0.10503) 
1.1144 
(0.14494) 
      1.7047  * 
       (0.1693)  
Lagged Dividend + 3.9143  *** 
(0.16517) 
2.3457   ** 
(0.17059) 
      0.0245  
      (0.2256) 
Dtimes N/A           0.0859  - -  
 
Dum2008 
 
N/A 
(0.1496)  
  1.7872 * 
(0.1705) 
 
0.1715 
(0.1444) 
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Dum2009 N/A 0.7529 
(0.1474) 
-0.0226 
(0.159) 
Dum2010 N/A           0.5557 
        (0.2460) 
 
-0.5589 
(0.1967) 
    86%  
   adj 85% 
N 75 
F-Sta. 69.70 
 
The table 5.5 shows that dynamic model parameter estimates which are much closer to 
reality. Considering a dynamic model, in which past experience can affect current 
dividend payout. The coefficient on the lagged dividend, varies from 0.64, obtain in 
OLS estimation, to 0.0055, when GMM (sys) is used (appendix 4). Thus, the speed of 
adjustment (1-α) is located within [0.995, 0.354]. Obviously, speeds of the adjustment 
coefficient of a magnitude of the 0.354 make less economic sense than a coefficient of 
0.995. Because most of the firms in our sample have not changed their dividend payout; 
  
The inclusion of the lagged variable could make the possible existence of the 
endogeneity in our model. This issue is present when the independent variables are not 
exogenous; they can be related to other independent variable, to account for this 
possible issue, we use instrumental variables technique.  
We test whether the variables present endogeneity through the Hausman test, we also 
used the Sargan test and the Week instrumental test to check for the validity and 
strength of the instruments used to test the independent variables. Bear in mind that the 
entire chosen instruments were exogenous. The best instruments in panel data and time 
series analysis are lags of the tested variables. 
Eventually existence of the correlation in the model, we use instrumental variables to 
correct problem of the endogenety. According Marques (2000) the regressor is 
endogenous when it is correlated with the error term. The term error is affecting the 
regressor of our variables and therefore indirectly affecting dividend payout.  
We tested whether the variables through the Hausman and Sargan test, obtained by 
regression with instrumental variables, in this case (return on equity and ratio between 
retained earnings to total assets) by Two-stage last squares estimators. We regress 
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individually each independent variables suspected of being correlated with the error on 
all of the instruments. We found that any variables present endogeneity and finally 
through the Sargan test the results obtained allows us to conclude that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis for a significance level of 1%, so we conclude that all the 
instruments are valid (Sargan test output on appendix 4). 
Considering the results of the second order autocorrelation tests and given the validity 
of the instruments, as well as the absence of second order autocorrelation, we conclude 
that the results of the GMM model (1991) may be considered valid. 
In this case, the variables that are the most significant to explain dividend payout were: 
logarithm of the firm size and Quick ratio variables. The firm size coefficient associated 
with the dividend payout was positively and statistically significant as it been presented 
in previous model. Therefore, may be at the financial crisis stage the large firms tending 
to have higher probability to pay dividends. 
According to the lagged dividend payout, the hypothesis from Lintner (1956) and 
DeAngelo et al. (2006), which dividend payment in the previous years is a strong 
predictor of dividend payment in current year. Against our expectation the causal 
relationship between previous dividend and current dividend is significant at 5% of the 
significance when we run fixed effect in model (2). It turns insignificant on GMM 
estimation, contrast with Lintner (1956). It could be due to our size, or even due to the 
characteristic of the Portuguese market; it is seems that the actual context the dividend 
was no present for the majority of companies.  Other fact, on Portuguese dividend is the 
high incidence of unchanged dividends every year. Just in 2010 we can see a little 
increase in dividend payout (see graphs 5.1).  
Regarding the dummies of the dynamic model is positive and not statistical significant 
and this finding came to reinforce an idea that have not impact of the financial crisis on 
dividend payout. There was little increase was associated with extraordinary dividend 
distribution occurred specially at the end of the year 2010 in various companies on 
results from eventual changes to the tax regime suggested in the national budget for 
2011 that would make the dividend distribution more costly for shareholders in the 
subsequent years.  
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It is also important to notice the extraordinary dividend distribution by Portugal 
Telecom, which remunerated its shareholder for the sale of a financial stake in the 
company (Vivo)
3
.This allowed a substantial increase in dividend distribution. Despite 
this increase, we cannot prove that there was impact of financial crisis on dividend 
payout in Portuguese capital market. 
The short-term elasticity is given by the direct coefficients of the variables, e.g. a 1% of 
the increase in short term in firms assets expected to induce a change of 1.03728 in the 
dividend payout, ceteris paribus.  On the other hand the long term elasticity is given by 
the direct coefficients of the independent variables divided by 1 minus the lagged 
dependent variable coefficient.  
After the previous estimations, we can conclude that both consider model (static and 
dynamic) the financial crisis have not affect dividend payout.  
 
From table 5.2, we can sum up: In view of our results, we can be concluded that have 
not impact of the financial crisis on dividend payout. The structural levels of the 
dividend payout have not change. Despite the year 2010 were atypical years in the 
matter of distribution of dividend as we mentioned in the univariate analysis, the most 
of the companies increase their payout. 
In 2010, the return on equity of the Portuguese companies listed on PSI20 increase in 
comparison with years 2009. The year 2010 also was marked by high volatility, loss in 
market capitalization and dropped stock prices. This may be the reason why some of the 
companies decided to increase dividends in order to give some guarantee to the 
investors and also avoid accentual fall in asset prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
is the largest telecommunications company in Brazil  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This section will firstly provide a discussion of the results, comparing the similarities 
and differences with previous literature. In the section 5.1 conclusions will be drawn 
and the main research question will be answered. Subsequently, section 5.2 the 
limitations of this research along with suggestions for future research regarding the 
impact of the financial crisis on dividend payout policies will be presented. 
6.1 Discussion of the results 
 
Dividend policy is one of the most important parts of the firm’s long-run financing 
strategies. More, still remains as one of the great puzzles in finance; refer Berk and 
DeMarzo (2011).  
The financial crisis triggered in 2006, from the breakdown of credit institutions in 
United States (US), which granted mortgage loans high risk, leading several banks to 
insolvency and impacting heavily on the stock exchanges worldwide. The crisis was 
revealed to the public from February 2007, as a financial crisis. During the start of a 
crisis, specific market conditions affect normal relationship between dividend payout 
and shareholder return, financing costs increase and free cash flows dropped. These 
conditions let to several consequences including the lack of the liquidity.  Firms can 
take measures to safeguard the interest of the investors. One of these measures is to pay 
out dividend to investors. 
Our study comprehends a dataset composer of 12 PSI-20 companies. We decide to 
exclude financial institutions, since these corporations are governed by different 
regulation in regard to their dividend policies.  All data used in this study are an annual 
frequency and ranges from 2005 to 2012, which eliminates the problem of the 
seasonality. So, the sample is an unbalanced panel data. 
We estimate our model by using panel data regressions which combined time-series and 
cross-sectional observations and estimated together. The main advantage of the panel 
data methodology is the elimination of the heterogeneity, namely the unobservable 
characteristic of the contracting environment. To analyze the impact of the financial 
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crisis on dividend payout we use the two common techniques for estimating model with 
panel data, which are: Pooled ordinary least squares and the fixed effects model. 
The choice of the model to the data that we intend to analyses is done based on the 
results of appropriate tests. We use appropriate test statistics, namely the F-statistic and 
the Hausman test to choose the most appropriate model for the particular sample. The F-
statistic tests the null hypothesis that the efficient estimator is the pooled ordinary least 
squares compared to the fixed effects model. The Hausman statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that random effects model is appropriated for the particular sample 
compared to the fixed effects model. 
The dependent variable used to measure the impact of the financial crisis on dividend 
policies is dividend payout of the each company. 
The variable of greater importance it is dummy variable. The coefficient associated with 
the dummy variable present positive signal and insignificant in both models, proposing 
that have no impact of the financial crisis on dividend. In contrast with Hauser (2013); 
the author found a decrease of the dividend payout in 2008 and 2009. He argues that 
this decrease on dividend payout is because of the financial crisis effects. On the same 
subject while Smits (2012) found that the financial crisis did not affect the dividend 
payout.  
Our empirically results arising from the different proposed models, univariate analysis 
show that there is increase on the dividend payout, as we can see in 2010, almost all 
companies increased their dividend payout The main reason for this increase, is due, in 
part, to the some of the companies wanted to let their investors comfortable and 
reinforce confidence, while the stock market prices were depressed. It is also important 
to notice the extraordinary dividend distribution by Portugal Telecom, which 
remunerated its shareholders for the sale of a financial stake in the company (Vivo)
4
.   
The payout increase was also associated with the extraordinary dividend distribution 
that occurred at the end of the year 2010 in various companies resulting from changes to 
tax regime suggested in the national budget for 2011. This would make the dividend 
distribution more costly for shareholders in the subsequent years. 
                                                          
4
is the largest telecommunications company in Brazil  
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In our results the others main factors that determine the dividend payout are firm size 
variable, Market-to-book ratio, financial leverage variable and quick ratio.  
 In terms of the firm size in both of the model our find is corroborate with previous 
studies such as Fama and French (2001). In addition, market–to-book values have a 
negative and significant influence on dividend payout at 5% level of significance just in 
model (1). Our result is partially in agreement with the findings from preview literature, 
such as Smits (2012), Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). 
We also found that firm leverage have a negative and significant influence on dividend 
payout at 5% level of significance  meaning that  non-financial companies in Portugal 
have higher debt level. To a certain extent this explains the smaller return on equity for 
the shareholders (see graphs 5.1).  The companies with higher degree of debt in its 
capital structure discloser larger risk and as a result higher interest expenses with the 
debt service and consequently lower dividend payout. 
6.2 Limitations  
 
The principal limitation of this dissertation is the sample size and especially the number 
of missing values in the dataset. In the future this problem could be solved by 
examining the impact of the financial crisis on the dividend payment policy on a greater 
scale. For example, this dissertation focusses just on listed companies on PSI20 and 
future research could also look at other companies in Portugal even in Spain in order to 
get bigger time period. Additionally, in the future it could be interesting to study the 
impact of financial crisis on dividend payout of the industry sector. Unfortunately, that 
was not possible in this dissertation because of the limited sample size and amount of 
the missing values. 
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Appendix – 1 – List of firms include in our study 
 
Appendix -2- Static panel data model  
Model 4: Pooled OLS, using 90 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 5, maximum 8 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -13.5162 1.78106 -7.5889 <0.00001 *** 
l_Assets 1.63187 0.113425 14.3872 <0.00001 *** 
Mtb 0.203648 0.0715983 2.8443 0.00560 *** 
Beta -1.48905 0.431299 -3.4525 0.00088 *** 
Lev -0.00494787 0.00542774 -0.9116 0.36462  
Qr 0.496828 0.268319 1.8516 0.06763 * 
Dtime 0.285323 0.267355 1.0672 0.28897  
 
Mean dependent var  10.62533  S.D. dependent var  2.300523 
Sum squared resid  119.5970  S.E. of regression  1.200386 
R-squared  0.746092  Adjusted R-squared  0.727737 
F(6, 83)  40.64827  P-value(F)  1.03e-22 
Log-likelihood -140.4988  Akaike criterion  294.9975 
Schwarz criterion  312.4962  Hannan-Quinn  302.0540 
rho  0.453430  Durbin-Watson  0.907129 
 
   RESET test for specification - 
   Null hypothesis: specification is adequate 
   Test statistic: F(2, 81) = 8.05676 
   with p-value = P(F(2, 81) > 8.05676) = 0.000643897 
 
   White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
   Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
  Test statistic: LM = 33.502 
   with p-value = P(Chi-square(26) > 33.502) = 0.148028 
 
Name emails
Altri, SGPS, SA www.altri.pt
Brisa - Auto Estradas de Portugal, SA www.Brisa.pt
Cofina - SGPS, SA www.cofina.pt
EDP - Energias de Portugal, SA www.edp.pt
GALP Energias - SGPS, SA www.galpenergia.com
Jerónimo Martins - SGPS, SA www.mediacapital.pt
Mota-Engil, SGPS, SA www.mota-engil.pt
Portucel - Empresa Produtora de Pasta e Papel, SA www.telecom.pt
Portugal Telecom, SGPS, SA www.ptmultimedia.pt
Semapa - Sociedade Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, SA www.semapa.pt
Sonae -  SGPS, SA www.sonae.pt
Zon Optimus - Serviços de Telecomunicações e  Multimédia - SGPS, S.A www.nos.pt
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   Chow test for structural break at observation 6:8 - 
   Null hypothesis: no structural break 
   Test statistic: F(7, 76) = 6.50187 
   with p-value = P(F(7, 76) > 6.50187) = 5.15791e-006 
 
   2.1 Panel data diagnostic 
 
Fixed effects estimator 
allows for differing intercepts by cross-sectional unit 
slope standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets 
 
       const:         4.1865        (4.6602)       [0.37199] 
    l_Assets:          0.479       (0.31928)       [0.13792] 
         Mtb:      -0.076687      (0.048846)       [0.12081] 
        Beta:       -0.10653       (0.27148)       [0.69591] 
         Lev:     -0.0099586     (0.0078053)       [0.20610] 
          Qr:        0.04665       (0.17087)       [0.78562] 
       Dtime:        0.10344       (0.14014)       [0.46284] 
 
12 group means were subtracted from the data 
 
Residual variance: 25.5008/(90 - 18) = 0.354178 
Joint significance of differing group means: 
 F(11, 72) = 24.1523 with p-value 6.47274e-020 
(A low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model 
is adequate, in favor of the fixed effects alternative.) 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan test statistic: 
 LM = 69.7423 with p-value = prob(chi-square(1) > 69.7423) = 6.75824e-017 
(A low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model 
is adequate, in favor of the random effects alternative.) 
 
Variance estimators: 
 between = 0.329595 
 within = 0.354178 
Panel is unbalanced: theta varies across units 
 
                         Random effects estimator 
           allows for a unit-specific component to the error term 
           (standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets) 
 
          const:        -9.6986        (2.4696)       [0.00018] 
       l_Assets:         1.4099       (0.16013)       [0.00000] 
            Mtb:      -0.010078      (0.057931)       [0.86232] 
           Beta:       -0.56597       (0.31986)       [0.08049] 
            Lev:      -0.011358     (0.0066609)       [0.09189] 
             Qr:         0.1069       (0.20177)       [0.59767] 
          Dtime:       0.098869       (0.17235)       [0.56774] 
 
Hausman test statistic: 
 H = 63.9602 with p-value = prob(chi-square(6) > 63.9602) = 7.03237e-012 
(A low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the random effects 
model is consistent, in favor of the fixed effects model.) 
 
 
 
2.2 – fixed effects Model  
 
Model 6: Fixed-effects, using 90 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
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Time-series length: minimum 5, maximum 8 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 4.18651 2.06846 2.0240 0.04668 ** 
l_Assets 0.478996 0.147785 3.2412 0.00180 *** 
Mtb -0.0766867 0.0300951 -2.5481 0.01296 ** 
Beta -0.106533 0.298239 -0.3572 0.72198  
Lev -0.00995863 0.00439176 -2.2676 0.02636 ** 
Qr 0.0466499 0.105614 0.4417 0.66003  
Dtime 0.103442 0.098886 1.0461 0.29903  
 
Mean dependent var  10.62533  S.D. dependent var  2.300523 
Sum squared resid  25.50078  S.E. of regression  0.595128 
LSDV R-squared  0.945861  Within R-squared  0.090470 
LSDV F(17, 72)  73.99470  P-value(F)  1.30e-38 
Log-likelihood -70.95494  Akaike criterion  177.9099 
Schwarz criterion  222.9065  Hannan-Quinn  196.0551 
rho -0.432738  Durbin-Watson  2.577412 
 
    Joint test on named regressors - 
   Test statistic: F(6, 72) = 1.19363 
   with p-value = P(F(6, 72) > 1.19363) = 0.319552 
 
   Test for differing group intercepts - 
   Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
   Test statistic: F(11, 72) = 24.1523 
   with p-value = P(F(11, 72) > 24.1523) = 6.47274e-020 
 
 
2.2.1 – fixed effects Model with annual effects 
 
Model 7: Fixed-effects, using 90 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 5, maximum 8 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 3.6501 1.88131 1.9402 0.05639 * 
l_Assets 0.519956 0.136345 3.8135 0.00029 *** 
Mtb -0.0788586 0.0272897 -2.8897 0.00513 *** 
Beta -0.124099 0.294339 -0.4216 0.67459  
Lev -0.0112304 0.00457747 -2.4534 0.01664 ** 
Qr 0.0603937 0.118399 0.5101 0.61160  
Dum2008 0.229884 0.160504 1.4323 0.15652  
Dum2009 0.0495306 0.0776553 0.6378 0.52567  
Dum2010 0.0280065 0.176954 0.1583 0.87470  
 
Mean dependent var  10.62533  S.D. dependent var  2.300523 
Sum squared resid  25.24186  S.E. of regression  0.600498 
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LSDV R-squared  0.946411  Within R-squared  0.099705 
LSDV F(19, 70)  65.06476  P-value(F)  6.78e-37 
Log-likelihood -70.49571  Akaike criterion  180.9914 
Schwarz criterion  230.9876  Hannan-Quinn  201.1528 
rho -0.468070  Durbin-Watson  2.651725 
 
    Joint test on named regressors - 
   Test statistic: F(8, 70) = 0.969034 
   with p-value = P(F(8, 70) > 0.969034) = 0.467263 
 
  Test for differing group intercepts - 
  Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
  Test statistic: F(11, 70) = 23.4594 
  with p-value = P(F(11, 70) > 23.4594) = 2.76902e-019 
 
       
 Appendix 3 - model (II) – dynamic panel data   model 
 3.1 pooled OLS 
Model 8: Pooled OLS, using 75 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 3, maximum 7 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -4.59072 2.41919 -1.8976 0.06199 * 
l_Assets 0.581846 0.284854 2.0426 0.04497 ** 
Mtb 0.069025 0.0377281 1.8295 0.07170 * 
Beta -0.797798 0.53593 -1.4886 0.14121  
Qr 0.171208 0.105039 1.6299 0.10774  
Dtime 0.0128548 0.149672 0.0859 0.93181  
l_Div_1 0.646533 0.165174 3.9143 0.00021 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  10.81018  S.D. dependent var  2.159520 
Sum squared resid  48.43984  S.E. of regression  0.844009 
R-squared  0.859636  Adjusted R-squared  0.847251 
F(6, 68)  69.40898  P-value(F)  4.77e-27 
Log-likelihood -90.02668  Akaike criterion  194.0534 
Schwarz criterion  210.2758  Hannan-Quinn  200.5308 
rho -0.595451  Durbin-Watson  2.546665 
 
    RESET test for specification - 
    Null hypothesis: specification is adequate 
    Test statistic: F(2, 66) = 3.592 
   with p-value = P(F(2, 66) > 3.592) = 0.1330535 
    
   3.2 FIXED –EFFECT BASIC 
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Model 11: Fixed-effects, using 75 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 3, maximum 7 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 13.9381 6.0331 2.3103 0.02452 ** 
l_Assets 0.126801 0.330436 0.3837 0.70260  
Mtb -0.114865 0.0471281 -2.4373 0.01794 ** 
Beta -0.100864 0.299807 -0.3364 0.73778  
Qr 0.152835 0.127187 1.2017 0.23446  
Dtime 0.192018 0.159554 1.2035 0.23377  
l_Div_1 0.452386 0.203752 2.2203 0.03039 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  10.81018  S.D. dependent var  2.159520 
Sum squared resid  19.48622  S.E. of regression  0.584691 
LSDV R-squared  0.943535  Within R-squared  0.219740 
LSDV F(17, 57)  56.02766  P-value(F)  2.84e-29 
Log-likelihood -55.87862  Akaike criterion  147.7572 
Schwarz criterion  189.4720  Hannan-Quinn  164.4135 
rho -0.119830  Durbin-Watson  2.073567 
 
    Joint test on named regressors - 
   Test statistic: F(6, 57) = 2.67543 
   with p-value = P(F(6, 57) > 2.67543) = 0.0233943 
 
    Test for differing group intercepts - 
   Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
   Test statistic: F(11, 57) = 7.69941 
   with p-value = P(F(11, 57) > 7.69941) = 5.9607e-008 
  
3.3 FIXED EFFECT WITH ANNUAL EFFECTS 
 
Model 12: Fixed-effects, using 75 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 3, maximum 7 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 13.674 6.01132 2.2747 0.02684 ** 
l_Assets 0.154735 0.329532 0.4696 0.64053  
Mtb -0.120348 0.0486718 -2.4726 0.01653 ** 
Beta -0.126355 0.313648 -0.4029 0.68861  
Qr 0.161522 0.144943 1.1144 0.26996  
Dum2008 0.304878 0.170593 1.7872 0.07942 * 
Dum2009 0.110955 0.147376 0.7529 0.45474  
Dum2010 0.136707 0.246003 0.5557 0.58066  
l_Div_1 0.464497 0.198021 2.3457 0.02263 ** 
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Mean dependent var  10.81018  S.D. dependent var  2.159520 
Sum squared resid  19.25692  S.E. of regression  0.591714 
LSDV R-squared  0.944199  Within R-squared  0.228922 
LSDV F(19, 55)  48.98151  P-value(F)  1.16e-27 
Log-likelihood -55.43472  Akaike criterion  150.8694 
Schwarz criterion  197.2192  Hannan-Quinn  169.3764 
rho -0.143981  Durbin-Watson  2.115056 
 
   Joint test on named regressors - 
   Test statistic: F(8, 55) = 2.04109 
   with p-value = P(F(8, 55) > 2.04109) = 0.0581823 
 
   Test for differing group intercepts - 
   Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
  Test statistic: F(11, 55) = 7.55118 
   with p-value = P(F(11, 55) > 7.55118) = 1.00951e-007 
 
APPENDIX 4- DYNAMIC ESTIMATION  
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Model 18: 2-step dynamic panel, using 75 observations 
Included 12 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 6 
Including equations in levels 
H-matrix as per Ox/DPD 
Dependent variable: l_Div 
Asymptotic standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
l_Div(-1) 0.00553679 0.225619 0.0245 0.98042  
const -5.16396 6.50391 -0.7940 0.42721  
l_Assets 1.03728 0.411769 2.5191 0.01177 ** 
Mtb 0.0483566 0.0781829 0.6185 0.53624  
Beta -0.115525 0.452696 -0.2552 0.79857  
Qr 0.288549 0.169267 1.7047 0.08825 * 
Dum2008 0.024769 0.144431 0.1715 0.86384  
Dum2009 -0.00360367 0.159124 -0.0226 0.98193  
Dum2010 -0.109917 0.196666 -0.5589 0.57623  
 
Sum squared resid  125.6968  S.E. of regression  1.380035 
 
Number of instruments = 35 
Test for AR(1) errors: z = -2.2128 [0.0269] 
Test for AR(2) errors: z = 0.687053 [0.4920] 
Sargan over-identification test: Chi-square(26) = 4.76061 [1.0000] 
Wald (joint) test: Chi-square(8) = 36.0254 [0.0000] 
 
